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Abstract 
Two of the most frightening time periods in modern America have occurred in close 
proximity to each other. The Cold War pitted the United States against a fierce ideological 
competitor that pointed its weapons of mass destruction at the United States and its allies. 
Shortly after its demise, the new great threat to peace emerged in the form of terrorism. These 
two enemies spur and foster a certain type of politics and rhetorical approach that shapes not 
only international relations but also domestic policies. Comparing these two periods alone does 
not offer the best analysis and approach to understanding certain changes in policies. In order to 
do this, Richard Hofstadter’s article explaining the Paranoid Style in American politics will be 
examined first, after which a comparison between the Cold War and the Global War on Terror 
can be made by looking at the rhetoric and the policies, and how these are examples of the 
Paranoid Style.  
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Introduction and purpose 
It was President Franklin Roosevelt who stated “…the only thing we have to fear is fear 
itself”, contending that politics is not immune from emotion. In fact, emotions have been used to 
influence policy on several occasions, with many of those situations involving catastrophes and 
retaliation. For example, the sinking of the Lusitanian, Pearl Harbor, the Oklahoma City 
bombings, 9-11-01, and even wildfires in the western portion of the United States sparked a type 
of response that was fueled by how people felt about these disasters. The question to ask is what 
kind of policy result should the American people expect when emotions are involved in the 
policy’s formation? 
This study will look at two time frames to investigate the policy results of fear: the Cold 
War, and the Global War on Terror. These two eras will provide case studies in which the central 
question can be asked: how has the rhetoric of fear, or about fear, changed from the Cold War to 
the Global War on Terror? To answer this question, a model will be formed based on Richard 
Hofstadter’s article titled “The Paranoid Style of American Politics” that will then be applied to 
each time period to provide evidence of the way in which policy mechanisms either quell or 
encourage action by emphasizing fear.  
The objective of this thesis is to examine this fundamental shift in rhetoric and policy and 
draw conclusions between the Cold War and the Global War on Terror about legislating off of 
emotion. During the Cold War, fear was a security measure that stopped people from acting 
irrationally and spawned policies to follow this emotional lead. On the other hand, fear has 
emerged as a tool or as a weapon during the Global War on Terror for policy reform and 
international action. In both of these cases, the paranoid style model that will be presented can 
help explain how the periods were framed.  
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The Paranoid Style of American Politics 
Richard Hofstadter identifies a style of politics in America that is very applicable to the 
topic at hand. His analysis of American politics focuses on extremist rhetoric that sparks “the 
sense of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy”1 from the beginning of 
American politics up until 1964. The examples that he uses to illustrate this paranoid style range 
from Illumism and the Illuminati, anti-Catholic pogroms, and McCarthyism. Any time extremist  
rhetoric was used as a means to achieve a certain political goal against a specific group of 
people, Hofstadter claims that it is evidence of a paranoid style being used. This style of politics 
is not based on truth or falsity, but in how ideas are communicated to the public and how they 
elicit a reaction among the populous that, although exhibiting paranoid tendencies, promotes the 
passage of legislation.  
The paranoid style requires a conspiracy to establish the roles everyone is expected to 
play, with people falling into one of two categories: “us”, or “them”. Categorizing in this manner 
necessitates that an unambiguous definition of conflict, or the conspiracy, is given so that there is 
no doubt left as to who the participants are.  
The conspiracies that Hofstadter outlines are extreme right-wing conspiracy that can be 
summarized by three elements. The first element of the conspiracy states that there is a 
movement to “undermine free capitalism”2, or that the American way of life is under threat of 
being destroyed. This is the foundation for the rest of the conspiracy and is essential to remind 
Americans that their particular way of life is at threat of being demolished by agents of an 
oppressive regime, or by other actors that resent the American way of life. The second element is 
that the enemies are infiltrating the top levels of government. Once entrenched in their positions 
                                                
1 Hofstadter, Richard. 1964. “The Paranoid Style of American Politics”. Harper’s Magazine. Pg 77-86. Accessed at 
http://neuralgourmet.com/2008/05/09/paranoidstyle/ July 9, 2008. 
2 Hofstadter. 1964. 
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of power they are completely able to “shrewdly and consistently sell[ing] out American national 
interests.”3 Referring to spies or moles within the structure of the government simply allows the 
enemy an inside track for them to exploit American policy. The final element of the conspiracy 
theory is that “the country is infused with a network of [enemy] agents…so that the whole 
apparatus of education, religion, the press, and the mass media is engaged in a common effort to 
paralyze the resistance of loyal Americans”4. Meaning that no element of American society is 
safe or free from attack or manipulation, the enemies will use whatever tool they can to 
undermine American values. To perpetuate this conspiracy theory, the paranoid must re-affirm to 
the people that enemies, in fact, exist, and their sole aim is to undermine or take over the country 
by either legitimate means or force. The paranoid does not just spout out his theory of the other 
attempting to ruin the world that we know. It is much more formulaic according to Hofstadter. 
Using what is at the paranoids’ disposal, they will frame the world in an “Us versus Them” 
situation and forces those involved to pick a single side. But if the side of the paranoid is not 
chosen, then that person is obviously against them. For instance, it is as if he is saying to those 
who believe in what he is speaking about, that if you do not believe him and his theory about the 
world, then it is obvious that you are a part of the attempt to destroy that world. The conspiracy 
offered is quite radical and rigid with little room to move or for alternatives to spring up.  
The question that arises is, “What type of person is this ‘paranoid’?” Before the 
characteristics of the paranoid are described, it is important to note that the paranoid person in 
politics is significantly different than a person who is disturbed in the mind. As Ellington points 
out, it is not the mentally ill that make the paranoid style, but “[I]t is the use of paranoid modes 
                                                
3 Hofstadter. 1964. 
4 Hofstadter. 1964.  
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of expression by more or less normal people that makes the phenomenon significant.”5 The 
paranoid is not someone who is bound to paranoia as a mental illness, but is a willing participant 
in constructing a society around the paranoid style. It is that desire, or volition, that distinguishes 
the paranoid as a political description from the psychological. Forcibly creating a paranoid 
atmosphere, as Ellington argues, is a controlled action of withholding information that allows 
people to buy into conspiracy theories6. Conspiracy theories thrive on the withholding of 
information to the general public, and it is in these conspiracy theories that the paranoid style can 
take hold and begin to grow. 
There are two distinct characteristics of a person who is in the paranoid style in American 
politics that are outlined in this model. The first characteristic of the paranoid is that he or she 
speaks of the world in fatal apocalyptic terms. Essentially, the paranoid will speak of the threats 
to his way of life by speaking of the enemy as a threat to “the birth and death of whole worlds, 
whole political orders, whole systems of human values.”7 In doing, so he will bring out other 
paranoids, anxious to turn them to see the world as he does. The paranoid can speak of the 
apocalypse in several different ways. It does not necessarily mean that the world will be 
destroyed, or that the anti-Christ will rise to oppress mankind; what it does mean is that the 
world, as “we” know it will be changed forever. For example, Hofstadter stated that phrases such 
as “Evidence is piling up on many sides and from many sources that October 1952 is the fatal 
month when Stalin will attack”8 is evidence of the paranoid style by speaking in terms of 
apocalypse.  
                                                
5 Ellington, Thomas. 2003. Won’t Get Fooled Again: The Paranoid Style in the National Security State. 
Government and Opposition Ltd. 436-455. Pg 438. 
6 Ellington. Pg 442. 
7 Hofstadter. 1964. 
8 Hofstadter. 1964. 
Sheldon 7 
The second characteristic is that a person in the paranoid style is a militant leader who 
will only accept total victory. There is no room for any compromise, nor can any partial victory 
be obtained without the possibility for chaos to ensue. Unfortunately, accepting anything but 
total victory leads to extreme goals. The aim of the militant leader is that the enemy must be 
totally eliminated, lest the remaining find another gathering and the whole process starts over 
again. The fight against the enemy is then framed in the battle between absolute good and 
absolute evil. Since the enemy is total evil, it is necessary for “good people” to remove the evil 
enemy from the “theatre of operation”9. Unfortunately this type of thinking, “leads to the 
formulation of hopelessly unrealistic goals, and since these goals are not even remotely 
attainable, failure constantly heightens the paranoid’s sense of frustration. Even partial success 
leaves him with the same feeling of powerlessness with which he began…”10 
Hofstadter states that the enemy is “on many counts the projection of the self; both the 
ideal and the unacceptable aspects of the self are attributed to him.”11 Having the enemy allows 
the paranoid to exist and to advocate his stance toward the world and pass his agenda based on 
the enemy’s actions. Without a specified enemy that is threatening society, the paranoid has no 
ground to stand on, or an enemy to emulate. As stated before, the enemy is “a perfect model of 
malice, a kind of amoral superman – sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sensual, luxury-
loving.”12 The enemy also is the type of person that will cause chaos at whims by facilitating 
“runs on banks, causing depressions, and manufacturing disasters”13. The enemy also is capable 
of covering up his tracks, or placing the blame of its misdeeds on other people by infiltrating the 
necessary businesses or outlets that is able to do this. For example, take the common debate 
                                                
9 Hofstadter. 1964. 
10 Hofstadter. 1964. 
11 Hofstadter. 1964. 
12 Hofstadter. 1964. 
13 Hofstadter. 1964. 
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between liberals and conservatives in America over media bias. Conservatives claim that their 
voices will not be heard favorably because of the liberal run media. This is a far stretch from 
saying that they are mortal enemies and if one or the other is in power it will lead to the end of 
the American way. However, take this example and place it in context of the paranoid model and 
it is easy to see how that argument can be made. Another attribute of the enemy is that it is 
masochistic. That is to say that looking at the damage, the chaos, and the turmoil or the end of 
societies that it has caused, it enjoys what it sees. The enemy has no regrets and strives to be able 
to claim responsibility for the destruction in which it causes.  
The paranoid and the enemy that opposes him, whether imaginary or physically real, act 
off of each other according to the risks at stake. If a way of life and society is at risk, that high 
risk necessitates radical and immediate action. Not acting immediately or doing enough to stop 
the destruction would have catastrophic consequences that no one will be ready to acknowledge 
or accept responsibility for. Thus, the paranoid style does more than constructs a conspiracy, or 
defines an enemy; the paranoid style requires action.  
The paranoid style is used as a call for action based on two objectives according to 
Nikolaev and Porpora, who analyze President Bush’s pre-war rhetoric in relation to the paranoid 
style. They argue that using the paranoid style achieves two objectives. The first is framing the 
issue, or “to monopolize the interpretation the public receives of an event”14. Being the first to 
explain why something has happened, a person is able to define the boundaries of further debate 
with the first statement. By defining the interpretation, the paranoid leader is able to rally support 
by regulating the story that the public hears. Which, in turn achieves the second objective: 
                                                
14 Nikolaev, Alexander and Douglas Porpora.2006. President Bush’s Pre-War Rhetoric on Iraq: Paranoid Style in 
Action. Critical Inquiry in Language studies: an international journal. 3(4). 245-262. Pg 249 
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neutralizing “opposition through the value-based interpretation of a certain political issue.”15 
These two objectives are the bridge between the paranoid actor, and the paranoid style. The 
stated objectives serve as what the paranoid actor needs to accomplish before the paranoid style 
can take place. Only after the issue has been framed and opposition to it has been silenced can 
the apocalyptic spouting militant leader create the situation in which American interests are at 
risk.  
The Paranoid Style that Hofstadter wrote about is a model that can be used as a tool to 
describe parts of American history. It transcends political boundaries and breaches into 
psychology and attempts to form a political psychology theory for the way things are done. The 
examples that Hofstadter provides in his theory gives rise to a new interpretation of events. One 
of these examples that Hofstadter used that is later expanded on is that of the Anti-Masonry 
movement. William Gribbin evaluates the Anti-Masonry in relation to the Paranoid style of 
political psychology. He says “[H]ere was a social phenomenon meeting all of Hofstadter's 
criteria for paranoid politics: an anti-elitist crusade provoked by some real grievances against 
vaguely defined conspiratorial forces, which were thought to threaten not just the status and 
pocketbooks of the Antimasons but all that was good in American life.”16 Further, Gribbin agrees 
with the characterization of the paranoid leader placing all the blame on a single group. He 
argues that “[A]ccusing its foes of every diabolical evil, projecting upon them the guilt for the 
social dislocations of a time of economic and cultural change, Antimasonry seemed a prelude to 
the anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant bigotry that developed soon afterwards.”17 
                                                
15 Nikolaev and Porpora. 2006. Pg 349. 
16 Gribbin, William. 1974. Antimasonry, Religious Radicalism, and the Paranoid Style of the 1820's. The History 
Teacher, Vol. 7, No. 2. pp. 239-254. Pg 241. 
17 Gribbin. 1974. Pg 241. 
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The Paranoid Style of American politics depicts a story where government agents blame 
failures of policy on the enemy, act in direction opposition to perceived enemies and in general, 
fear monger in order to achieve their objectives. It is something that can penetrate even to culture 
and spur either critiques or descriptions of modern culture as it is clearly articulated in the movie 
“V for Vendetta”. In the movie, a terrorist that goes by the name V has encouraged and incited 
the people of London to rise up against the oppressive British government. In order to maintain 
stability, control and power, the Supreme Chancellor, Adam Sutler, gives a broadcast to the 
general public on the eve of the supposed uprising. In this speech, he uses fear as a tool in an 
attempt to retain support for his regime against Agent V. Not to drive the people to fear the 
government, but to love the government and what they are doing to protect the people. This is 
first mentioned when the terrorist V takes over the media outlet building and broadcasts a 
message in part condemning the people of London. He does this by proclaiming that, “Fear got 
the best of you, and in your panic you turned to the now High Chancellor, Adam Sutler. He 
promised you order, he promised you peace, and all he demanded in return was your silent, 
obedient consent.”18 And reiterated later by the High Chancellor himself later in the movie when 
he bluntly tells his cabinet members,  
…what we need is a clear message to the people of the country! This message should be read in every 
newspaper, heard on every radio, seen on every television. This message must resound throughout the 
entire interlink! I want this country to realize that we stand on the edge of oblivion! I want every man, 
woman, and child to understand how close we are to chaos! I want everyone to remember why they need 
us!19  
This speech is followed by a flood of media reports of disaster, the need for unity, and the fear of 
coming and past terrorist events. In each case, the government has either stepped in to help stop 
the negative consequences, or has appeared to fix the problems after the fact. In which policy is 
                                                
18 McTeigue, James. 2006. V for Vendetta. Warner Bros Studio. 
19 McTeigue. 2006.  
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implemented and news is reported to rally the people behind the government when in fact those 
policies and those news stories may not exist or be true. 
As fictional as all this is, it provides an example as how the Paranoid Style is used in 
politics. The British government that is created in the film is one that touts that peace and 
security are maintained by unity itself. Dissent is only evidence of involvement in the conspiracy 
to destroy the British way of life. However, to truly understand this mindset, it has to be taken 
out of the fictional realm and examine it in the real world. Specifically, how has the paranoid 
style been used in the two case studies this thesis examines: the Cold War and the Global War on 
Terror? 
 
Policy Through Rhetoric 
The Cold War and the Global War on Terror are both examples that offer evidence of 
how speaking of fear does not necessarily mean that only an irrational fear that subject to the 
Paranoid Style. This position is reached by analyzing the rhetoric used in both policy formation 
process and in the spread of information to the general public. The Cold War and the Global War 
on Terror both offer ample amounts of evidence through rhetoric that either proves the paranoid 
style, or that a legitimate fear existed. After that initial question is answered, the next logical 
questions are: What distinguishes the two times from each other? and What factors allow the 
Paranoid Style to flourish or discourages it from taking root? 
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The Cold War 
The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union is certainly unique. Here 
is a time period where two super powers are directly opposed to each other in terms of ideology. 
However, instead of outright confrontation, an arms race and proxy wars were employed. 
Eventually, the struggle ended without violence. That is not to say that confrontation and raised 
tensions were absent. Throughout the course of the Cold War, there are several different “eras” 
that can be defined. Peter Hough frames the Cold War in three vaguely defined time periods. The 
first phase is defined as the “First Cold War” this phase is littered with confrontation and 
conflict.20 This period witnessed the conflicts in Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam. Although the 
conflicts in Korea and Vietnam were armed conflicts, it was the Cuban Crisis that reshaped and 
set the tone for the next period of the cold war, “Détente”. After coming to terms of what an all 
out nuclear war would do to the world during the missile crisis, tensions eased, the Cold War 
thawed. The super powers began to work with each other and tried to stabilize international 
relations. That lasted until crisis once again loomed with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that 
brought about the “Second Cold War” which lasted until the end of the Cold War altogether.  
 Dr Jack Ryan describes the Cold War in general in the movie “The Sum of all Fears” 
(which takes place in post-Cold War society). In the movie, Russia and America become 
entangled in a conflict after a nuclear device is detonated in Baltimore by terrorists. After that 
terrorist incident, the United States and Russia enter into a catastrophic conflict blaming each 
other for recent military strikes. Dr Ryan’s aim as an analyst is to figure out who is really at fault 
and to stop something worse from happening. In his attempts to negotiate to stop further nuclear 
use, he states to both presidents that, “Now it's about fear! Our fear of your missiles, your fear of 
our subs, fear of being weak, fear of making a mistake... the same fear of the other guy that had 
                                                
20 Hough, Peter. 2004 (2006). Understanding Global Security. Routledge; New York. Pg 26-27. 
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us build these goddamn bombs in the first place!”21 In this hypothetical, the Cold War, and even 
the subsequent world order, is dominated by the two states acting off of each other. During this 
era, the Cold War arms race, in global politics, the Paranoid Style took hold and guided the 
modus operandi.  
Within the context of the Cold War, there are several indicators that point to a paranoid 
style being used to shape American foreign policy. These indicators are separated into two 
categories of analysis: political rhetoric and policy. Examples of political rhetoric are going to be 
limited to politicians’ speeches to the public and to each other. Limiting the examples in this 
manner ensures that only firsthand accounts of policy are used. The second category of 
indicators is the policies themselves. Policy, however, is not just legislation. It should be defined 
as the rules that govern action, whether or not they are explicitly stated. These can include policy 
that is apparent in the speeches mentioned beforehand, or from third party analysis outside of the 
policy makers themselves.  
 
Pre-Cuban Missile Crisis 
After the end of World War II, the intentions and actions of the USSR came into question 
by US diplomats and was the subject of a telegram sent by George Kennan, who worked at the 
Moscow embassy. The long telegram, which became known as the “X Article” describes the 
intentions and motivations Soviet action and how the United States should react and respond22. 
The telegram explains that the Soviets will act to protect their interests in Socialism, even if it 
                                                
21 Robinson, Phil Alden. 2002. The Sum of all Fears. Paramount Pictures. 
22 Kennan, George. 2001 (1946). Long Telegram. In Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts 
‘Long Telegrams’ of 1946 ed Kenneth Jensen. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. Pp 17-31. Pg 17. 
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means that it is at odds with Capitalist, or Western, interests. In the six excerpts that follow, 
Kennan describes what the world should expect in terms of Soviet policy.  
The first is that the USSR will attempt to “undermine general political and strategic 
potential of major Western Powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national 
self-confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial 
unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity.”23 The USSR is going to attempt to undermine western, 
pro-democratic countries by massive grassroots movements to show the strengths of communism 
versus those of capitalism. The second action that Kennan outlines is the separation of Western 
powers from colonial ties by violent efforts24, thereby exploiting the weaknesses of Western 
administrations and their need to create new markets. Of course, after the colonies declare 
independence, Communist governments will be prepared “to take over domestic power.”25 If 
these governments do not go willingly, the USSR will be prepared to remove these individual 
governments in their attempt to take control. Thus, removing and installing these governments is 
the third plank of the Soviet plan of action26. The fourth step, as Kennan suggests, is that the 
“Communists will…work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence – economic, 
political or moral.”27 The fifth contention, of Kennan’s argument is that the Soviets will seek to 
pit all of the Western Powers against each other. Ranging from Germany, Britain, to America, 
the unity of these nations must be compromised at any cost28. All five of these are then followed 
by a final characterization. Kennan argues, “all Soviet efforts…will be negative and destructive 
in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is 
                                                
23 Kennan. 2001 (1946). Pg 27. 
24 Kennan. 2001 (1946). Pg 27. 
25 Kennan. 2001 (1946). Pg 28. 
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only in line with basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that 
constructive work can start only when Communist power is dominant.”29 
This telegram from Moscow was what led to the US’s policy of containment in which it 
was a clearly stated goal to limit the spread of communism30. Beyond the consequences of the 
telegram, looking at the language of it shows the makings of a paranoid style. He has defined a 
conflict in which American interests are at stake by enemies who will attempt to undermine its, 
or its allies’, way of life. Two of the three criteria of the model are met by what Kennan 
advocates. However, the paranoid style never comes to fruition during the Cold War. Kennan 
never calls for the complete and total destruction of the Soviet Union or of communism; just that 
it should be contained. The United States was to “’hold the line and firmly resist Soviet and 
Communist expansion by providing a counterpoint to their ‘shifting geographical and political 
maneuvers’”31. It was not to undermine or destroy Soviet states, but it was a defensive stance to 
prevent them from expanding.  
Assuming the telegram signals the beginnings of the official Cold War, the rhetoric of the 
telegram does not deviate any from depicting the situation of “us versus them”. Defining the 
conflict in this way does not necessitate any act of hostility between the two parties while at the 
same time assumes that if there is any such hostility, only one side can remain in existence or as 
a clear winner. The paranoid style requires total victory, and anything less that complete 
domination is only the first stage of defeat. Yet, the Cold War super powers did not dominate the 
world stage, but they shared it with their opposite. The Cold War was hostile but at the same 
time, it was played by certain rules that encouraged cooperation. 
                                                
 
30 Roberts, Chalmers M. 1972. How Containment Worked. Foreign Policy No. 7. (Summer) pg 41-51 pg 41. 
31 Smith, Adam. 2003. New Kids on the Bloc: Revisiting Kennan’s Containment in a Pre-emptive World. Harvard 
International Review. Pg 30. 
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Nuclear Primacy 
The X Article set the stage on which the Cold War was to be acted upon. It was on this 
stage that certain actors emerged that would influence the rest of the war. One such actor was 
Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev attempted to distinguish himself from Stalin from the onset by 
condemning Stalin’s policies during the so-called “Secret Speech”. However, his attempts were 
sometimes misguided. Even though he implemented “efforts to reduce the intensity of the Cold 
War, his belligerency occasioned some of the most dangerous confrontations of the…period.”32 
For example, Chairman Khrushchev once stated that the USSR had the ability to “literally wipe 
from the face of the earth the country or countries that attacked us.”33 This concept, as appalling 
as it may have seemed to America, was reiterated on several different occasions by both the US 
and the USSR. Two prime examples of this are evident in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and by 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s speech on “Mutual Deterrence”34. 
In October of 1962, the Soviet government decided to place some of its nuclear missiles 
and launchers in Cuba, ninety miles off the Florida’s coast. This move sparked nation-wide, and 
even global fears that nuclear war was at the doorstep. However, it was done not to cause panic 
and chaos, but to guarantee the security of Cuba; there was “a sound military logic for the 
deployment of nuclear weapons as a deterrent force.”35 The result of this move fostered an 
exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev that provides insight 
into what the political leaders were thinking and feeling at the time. The lettered correspondence 
between Kennedy and Khrushchev is teeming with the rhetoric of fear of war, or other nasty 
consequences from arming, and the possibility of disarming, Cuba. Stretching from October 22, 
                                                
32 Nation, Craig. 1992. Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991. Cornell University 
Press. Ithaca, New York. pp 202-244. Pg 203. 
33 Nation. 1992. pp 235. 
34 McNamara, Robert. 1967. Mutual Deterrence. San Francisco. September 18. 
35 Nation. 1992. pp 237. 
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1962 to October 28, 1962, there were ten letters or telegrams that were exchanged by the two 
leaders, in which they both express and address concerns of possible war. President Kennedy’s 
first letter to Chairman Khrushchev on October 22 expressed Kennedy’s concerns and hopes 
“that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or deepen this already 
grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiations.”36 Making 
maintaining the peace a priori, Kennedy cared more about not pushing either country over the 
brink to war, stating that the measures that he and the US government were taking were very 
minimal, but that their resolve was firm. The threat in Cuba needed to be dealt with, but as 
gingerly and as carefully as possible. Khrushchev’s response to Kennedy came four days later 
acknowledging that war would not benefit either country. He leaves no question as to what his 
stance on and the consequences of open engagement would be: 
What would a war give you? You are threatening us with war. But you well know that the very least which 
you would receive in reply would be that you would experience the same consequences as those which you 
sent us…Armaments bring only disasters. When one accumulates them… and if one puts them to use, then 
they destroy people on both sides. Consequently, only a madman can believe that armaments are the 
principal means in the life of society. No, they are an enforced loss of human energy, and what is more are 
for the destruction of man himself… Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the 
rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will 
be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have 
the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot, and what that would mean is not for 
me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries 
dispose. 37 
 
The ball is thus placed back into Kennedy’s court and the administration takes its time in 
responding. This is in part due to the fact that they now have to respond to the question of war, 
not just the establishing of Soviet nuclear capabilities off the US coast, but open warfare between 
the USSR and the United States. Despite other communications during the thirteen-day period, 
Kennedy’s last telegram to Khrushchev refers to his statements from the October 26th letter and 
he agrees that something needs to be done to stop anything that would resemble warfare from 
                                                
36 Kennedy, John. October 22, 1962. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev. 
37 Khrushchev, Nikita S. October 26, 1962. Department of State Telegram Transmitting Letter from Chairman 
Khrushchev to President Kennedy. 
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happening. Further, Kennedy wants reassurance that war will not happen to essentially calm 
fears about potential war. President Kennedy, in part, states that, “Mr. Chairman, both of our 
countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United 
States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war.”38 
Being free from the fear of war is the ultimate reassurance. It is this concept, the one that 
the leaders desire peace and stability rather than complete destruction that negates the paranoid 
style. Had either President Kennedy or Chairman Khrushchev been a militant leader that sought 
only total victory over the enemy, the Cuban Missile Crisis would have been a conducive time 
for it to happen. Instead, the opposite occurred, and the situation was resolved peacefully. 
Indeed, the world was defined in fatal apocalyptic terms, due to the potential that the world could 
have ended during a nuclear war. But that definition was not acted upon to eliminate the enemy 
of “pure evil”. 
Unfortunately, the fear that was brought about during the Cuban Missile Crisis never 
subsides to where US-Soviet relations can be defined as friendly. In fact, fear remained present 
until the end of the Cold War and was reiterated over that time period by several different 
people. One of the most prominent people was Robert McNamara, who served as Kennedy’s 
Secretary of Defense, and whose role in the Cuban Crisis was. However, the speeches that 
McNamara delivered did not have an air of calming fears or of stopping hostility. What 
McNamara can be credited for was solidifying America’s stance when it came to mutual 
deterrence.39 McNamara, in this speech, outlines what mutual deterrence is, and how this concept 
does in fact prevent thermonuclear war. He states that nuclear war is deterred by “maintaining a 
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highly reliable ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon any single aggressor or combination 
of aggressors at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange…it is important to 
understand that assured destruction is the very essence of the whole deterrence concept.”40 
Essentially, that in order to protect America from any nuclear attack, America has to posses the 
ability to completely destroy anyone who would ever try to harm it with a nuclear weapon. As 
long as the United States held this capability, to wipe out the Soviet Union’s society during a 
second strike, it will remain safe from any attack. A single attack on either society would not go 
unpunished, nor would it be just a single attack. Both sides had decided that the nuclear silos 
would be the first targets in hopes to limit the amount of second-strike capability in an attempt to 
lose less during a nuclear war. McNamara’s speech outlined this very well. During the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, the rhetoric used between Kennedy and Khrushchev points to this understanding. 
The knots of war, asking what war would give the world, and everything that surrounded the 
Cuban Missile Crisis points to this mutual understanding of assured destruction.  
The Khrushchev era came to an abrupt end in 1964 with his forced retirement by the 
Party while he was on vacation. His obituary in the New York times states that, “it was a 
measure of the changes he had wrought that he was voted out of office, not shot, and that some 
of his key policies, such as peaceful coexistence and arms limitation and emphasis on Soviet 
consumer needs, were taken up by his successors…”41 
 
Presidential Responses 
From Truman to George H. W. Bush, each sitting US president has had to deal with the 
USSR and the threat its nuclear capabilities posed. The best cross-section of how a sitting 
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president framed the issue of a global threat and the concept of fear is to look at the major 
speeches of the presidents, specifically their Inaugural Addresses and the State of the Union 
Addresses. Richard Nixon, unfortunately, is mostly remembered for the Watergate scandal and 
his subsequent resignation before impeachment. However, Nixon did have policies and views on 
issues that were, at the time, spot on. His Inaugural Address, for instance, depicts a world in 
which war and the threat of war are horrible things that must be, and should be avoided. The 
Cuban Missile Crisis seemed to be a stark wake up call to all political leaders in the world that 
nobody wins a nuclear war. From this mindset Nixon remarks, “For the first time, because the 
people of the world want peace, and the leaders of the world are afraid of war, the times are on 
the side of peace.”42 Not only does he recognize that war needs to be avoided, he also recognizes 
that every leader that is capable of launching nuclear arms fears having to make that choice. 
Even the smallest skirmishes at that point had the very real potential of escalating into something 
much more dangerous; and Nixon wants to avoid that. He would much rather “play the role of 
peacemaker”43 and be remembered for preserving society instead of demolishing it. President 
Nixon went into office with a hope of seeing an end of hostilities, if not a de-escalation of 
conflict. Regardless, he did not want to go into his term thinking that it will be he that had to 
make the choice to attack or retaliate America’s enemies. He states in his closing that he has 
hope and that his eyes have seen the breaking of dawn that can bring a new period. That “our 
destiny offers, not the cup of despair, but the chalice of opportunity. So let us seize it, not in fear, 
but in gladness…let us go forward, firm in our faith, steadfast in our purpose, cautious of the 
dangers…”44 Nixon attempted to shed the fear of a nuclear war by moving past it as a viable 
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option. If peaceful opportunities offer themselves to be used, then they should be welcomed as 
policy in both the USSR and the United States.  
This mindset did not end with Nixon either; it was carried on in Ford’s presidency. Forget 
for a moment everything that surrounded Ford’s appointment and assent to the executive office. 
This is why his “inaugural address” is not used as part of the case study. His remarks when he 
came into office focus on the Nixon scandal and how the country ought to move on from that 
plight. It is not until his 1976 State of the Union Address (SUA) that he mentions foreign conflict 
or the Cold War in general. However, when he does he does not deviate much from Nixon’s 
stance. Ford claims that “we are at peace, and I will do all in my power to keep it that way.”45 
But he also does recognize the sobering reality of the danger that still exists in the world. The 
tool that he employs next is one that stretches back to the days of hardship during the 
Revolutionary War. President Ford said that to paraphrase Tom Paine “1976… was a year of 
fears and alarms and of dire forecasts-- most of which never happened and won't happen.”46 But 
the harsh reality of a nuclear arms race cannot be ignored.  
Being involved in an arms race of this magnitude is something that President Carter felt 
strongly about (and still does today). Even though it is nothing more than a passing note at the 
end of his inaugural speech, Carter leaves no doubt that he would like a world in which “we will 
move this year a step toward the ultimate goal -- the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this 
Earth. We urge all other people to join us, for success can mean life instead of death… we would 
hope that the nations of the world might say that we had built a lasting peace, built not on 
weapons of war but on international policies which reflect our own most precious values.”47 
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President Reagan, setting aside the political differences between the two presidents, 
echoes this. However, Reagan takes it further in terms of rhetoric than just speaking to the 
nuclear threat. Reagan’s structure and terminology that instills images are what the Cold War is 
remembered for. He acknowledged that the United States  
…and the Soviets have lived under the threat of mutual assured destruction; if either side resorted to the use 
of nuclear weapons, the other could retaliate and destroy the one who started it. Is there either logic or 
morality in believing that if one side threatens to kill tens of millions of out people, our only recourse is to 
threaten killing tens of millions of their’s?... We will meet with the Soviets, hoping that we can agree on a 
way to rid the world of the threat of nuclear destruction. We strive for peace and security…48 
 
In each of these speeches, Presidents did two things: the first is that they made attempts to calm 
the public and assure them that he will strive for peace. The second thing is counter to that, that 
while striving for peace we must recognize the fact that there is an enemy that is willing to 
launch nuclear missiles on the United States causing the extermination of the human race. In 
each instance, the reality and the hopes were all mentioned. This fails the test of the paranoid 
model as well. The Paranoid Style requires a militant leader to create the atmosphere; it is this 
lack of this type of leader that does not lead to a Paranoid Style. The evidence in the speeches of 
a call for peace and a rational approach to an enemy that will attack if it needs to is not the leader 
that speaks of an apocalyptic world where only total victory is accepted. Each president spoke of 
the presidency as an opportunity to lead the world into a lasting peace or at least to avoid an all 
out conflict leading to a nuclear war. In the paranoid style, the militant leader would ignore any 
opportunity for peace in order to entirely eliminate the enemy and claim complete victory. 
This is the reason that President Johnson was left out of this analysis. Johnson’s 
presidency was framed and started by a vast victory over Barry Goldwater, due in part to his 
infamous 1964 Daisy Ad. The ad indirectly states that electing Goldwater would lead the United 
States into a nuclear war with the USSR, and that to avoid this, the citizens must elect Johnson. 
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There is a difference of rhetoric between what has been previously mentioned. That is that the 
other presidents have said that they will strive for peace, whereas Johnson said Goldwater leads 
to war. The shift of subjects is important. Being involved in Vietnam Johnson could not say to 
the people that he would be a peaceful president. Instead, he had to paint himself as the lesser of 
two evils when compared to Goldwater. Regardless of what was happening at the time, nothing 
could compare to the damage that would happen if Goldwater were elected. The job of the 
president during the Cold War was to assure the people that he hoped that he would never have 
to make the choice of pushing the button or not, but that he will if it means protecting America.  
 
MAD 
One of the most well-known and most feared policies of the time was that of Mutual 
Assured Destruction. MAD takes typical deterrence, the notion that attacking country A would 
be to the detriment of the aggressor, and expands it to say, any type of wide-scale nuclear attack 
would be extremely destructive to all parties involved. MAD’s formation can be attributed to 
Robert McNamara in a series of speeches that he gave during the Kennedy administration. 
Speeches in Athens, Georgia and Ann Arbor, Michigan are two examples of policy that were 
“constituted a major Pentagon strategic initiative.”49 The formal term of assured destruction can 
be attributed to a study by General Glen Kent, who “developed two accounting devices which 
were called ‘damage limiting’ and ‘assured destruction’.”50 It was not until the Soviet Union 
developed the bomb and a delivery mechanism that some sort of nuclear war fighting strategy 
emerged; with these developments “came the onset of MAD. Washington abandoned its strategy 
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of a preemptive nuclear strike…”51 With the United States no longer being the sole nuclear 
power, a different approach to needed to be developed in order to coincide with multiple states 
possessing the bomb. It is argued that this emergence of a bi-polar, nuclear possessing, Cold War 
made the world stable and actually safer in the long run. Lieber and Press state that it was “MAD 
[that] made the world relatively stable and peaceful because it induced great caution in 
international politics, discouraged the use of nuclear threats to resolve disputes and generally 
retrained the superpowers’ behavior.”52 At the same time, MAD doctrine was not exclusive to 
the US.  
Although its coining can be attributed to US officials, the Soviets understood the concept 
just as well. There is a report that has been previously cited that looks at MAD as a concept 
critically. The report also contains in a chapter interviews with Soviet officials and commanders 
to get their take on the issue. The report states “The Soviet nuclear strategy relied heavily on 
deterrence…[their] strategists recognized that deterrence was, to some extent, mutual because 
each side was capable of launching a retaliatory strike and of inflicting unacceptable damage on 
the other.”53 The end result, even for the Soviets, was that there could not be any “meaningful 
concept of victory in nuclear warfare.”54 Another article gives the argument of why MAD, or 
mutual assured destruction, is actually preferable to other possible policies. In the conclusion, 
there are three indicators or reasons that lead to the conclusion of preferring mutual assured 
destruction. These three indicators “influence the probability that the U.S. will be able to avoid 
nuclear war with the Soviet Union: 1) the U.S. ability to deter premeditated attacks; 2) the crisis 
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stability of the nuclear situation; and 3) the robustness of the nuclear situation.”55 Using these 
criteria, a defensive stance and the mutual assured destruction stance are evaluated to determine 
which policy would provide better stability and security for all parties involved. The result is that 
the defensive stance, or the alternative to MAD does not hold up to the stringent standards for 
global security. In short, the claim is made that MAD provides stability better than the 
alternatives. The argument that removing mutual assured destruction as a policy directive and 
replacing it with an alternative, such as a defensive stance, increases the probability of nuclear 
war.56 MAD went from being a strategy and then later attained rhetorical status to prevent 
disaster.  
It was the existence of MAD that required caution to avoid disaster despite its attributes 
that look like elements of the Paranoid Style. Simply put, MAD argued that nuclear warfare 
would not only eliminate an enemy completely, and was something to be feared at all times, but 
would also cause the aggressor to be equally harmed. Overlooking the construct of MAD would 
be to underestimate the severity of any action deemed hostile. Having a policy that speaks of the 
world in apocalyptic terms was more than issue framing, or garnering support against inaction; it 
was MAD’s role in the Cold War that stopped action to prevent that apocalypse. Needless to say, 
mutual assured destruction, as a policy, was successful in preventing nuclear war.  
 
Conclusion of the Cold War 
The Cold War’s rhetoric and policy reflects the sensitivity and the tensions of the time. 
No other time in the history of mankind was there such a real threat of total destruction. Even 
still, the impacts of the nuclear arms race can be felt in entertainment media, politics, and every 
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day life. From movies, to books, to documentaries that explore the Cold War, the time period 
itself is fascinating and is represented in a myriad of ways in the entertainment. In the political 
spectrum, policies like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, START I and II, the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty, and many more all are the remnants of the Cold War. Setting aside their age and 
the fact that the USSR no longer exists, these treaties and international agreements exist to foster 
an atmosphere of peace throughout the world.  
The Cold War does posses some of the characteristics of the Paranoid Style, but does not 
entirely fit the model that was constructed. Certainly over the course of the conflict different 
elements are more evident than others, but that does not account for the lack of a militant leader. 
The fact that the presidents implemented policies for security and strived for peace rather than 
war and the eradication of the enemy goes to show a different emphasis and motivation. That is 
not to say that the Cold War was not a frightening time, or that fear was not felt across the globe. 
From bomb drills, to fallout shelters and other actions to show how afraid the people were, the 
Cold War was by no means a happy occasion. However, the overarching theme of the Cold War 
was to avoid outright confrontation, and that nuclear war was not the preferred option.  
 
 
Defining Terrorism 
Defining terrorism is no easy task. Most experts on the subject will agree to that 
statement. There have been countless books and articles dedicated to describing what terrorism is 
with no entirely acceptable definition as a result. That is not to say that no work has been 
accomplished to provide working definitions of the term, mindset, and acts. Prima facie, 
terrorism is nothing more than “violence – or, equally important, the threat of violence – used 
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and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim…This definition underscores clearly 
the other fundamental characteristic of terrorism: that it is a planned, calculated, and indeed 
systematic act.”57 The definition does not stop here either. Terrorism cannot be understood by 
simply looking at one definition. Another way to define terrorism is to define its unique 
characteristics. Aubry Cronin distinguishes four characteristics of what terrorism embodies. 
First, is that it is a political act. Second, is that terrorists are not states. That is they are individual 
actors that may be backed or supported by states. Third, terrorism does not target just military or 
political targets. The fourth characteristic is that they do not abide by international laws or 
agreements. They act, as it were, illegally.58 While a comprehensive definition is still elusive, 
these two can provide a working definition of the issue at hand. Terrorism, in short, is carefully 
planned, illegal violence carried out by individuals on innocent parties to achieve a stated 
political goal. Terrorism in this context came to the limelight as a major threat to global security 
after the events of 9-11. September 11, 2001 showed the means that global terrorist organizations 
were willing to take for their cause. The Global War on Terror was conceived as a direct result of 
catastrophic actions carried out by terrorists.  
 
9-11 / Global War on Terrorism 
At the risk of using a cliché, 9-11 changed the way the world, at least the United States, 
operated. The fact that a terrorist organization had attacked in a massive way on US soil that cost 
several thousand lives necessitated change. This was the first time that a foreign enemy had 
attacked on US soil since Pearl Harbor, and the second time since the war of 1812. With such 
rare instances of violence at home by foreign enemies, it would be hard to continue on without 
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seeing any type of policy change. Just as the attacks on Pearl Harbor brought about the United 
States’ entrance into World War II the attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and the 
fourth plane that did not reach its intended target forced the United States to act, once again, in 
the global theatre with force. With the attacks came a structural and rhetorical change that fits the 
Paranoid Style of American Politics by looking at the changes in context of the established 
model.  
The first change was the structure of warfare and international cooperation. According to 
the White House’s report of the first 100 days of the Global War on Terrorism, the “war against 
terrorism is the first war of the 21st Century – and it requires a 21st century military strategy.”59 
President Bush’s strategy, as well as Donald Rumsfeld’s, was to create a coalition of willing 
countries to take on the threat of terrorism in the country of Afghanistan. Using allied troops 
from the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
New Zealand, Poland, Russia and Turkey the United States made 9-11 a global event. This is not 
to say it was not already considered as much by the nationalities represented among those 
affected. There were a multitude of non-US citizens and residents that had worked at the WTC 
and approximately 120 countries represented at the two towers. However, it was an attack on the 
United States and on US soil. By joining together against an event of terrorism, and defining it as 
a global war, the burden of fighting these terrorists out to everyone else to do their part in the 
fight.  
Under this new type of warfare, the US headed “a global dragnet to help bring terrorists 
to justice and help prevent future terrorist acts.”60 In order to carry out this type of warfare, with 
an undetermined length and subjective terms of victory, the public’s support was necessary. To 
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attain this, President Bush and his administration used rhetorical devices and a specific langue to 
the people. Looking at what was said and is currently being said about terrorism in the United 
States, the people can get a sense of hypocrisy and confusion coming from political leaders. On 
one hand, the American people are being told not to be afraid, that terrorism cannot win, and that 
being afraid only empowers the terrorists. At the same time, it is also being said that if we do not 
do enough, than the terrorists can attack again, at even greater stakes and heavier costs.  
Further, the rhetoric from politicians experienced a change from pre-9-11 days. Speeches 
on 9-11 evolved from depicting a horrific event to using it as a political tool to fulfill policy 
agendas. President Bush’s first objective during the aftermath was to reassure the public to not be 
afraid. In a series of speeches following the event, Bush stated on that eve that, “Terrorist attacks 
can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of 
America. These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve”61; “I’m 
here to remind people that the best way to fight terrorism is to not let terrorism intimidate 
America”62; “With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the 
world and forsaking our friends… Freedom and fear are at war… Freedom and fear, justice and 
cruelty, have always been at war.”63 President Bush tried to solidify the resolve of the American 
people to rally them against the evils of terrorism. By defining the situation as freedom versus 
fear, Bush put before the people the ultimatum that you are either free, or you are afraid. If 
freedom is to be preserved, to be valued, and to endure, America must not be afraid. Not only 
must America not be afraid, but also this stance against terrorism must spread across the world. 
After Bush spoke to the American people, he turned his remarks to the Taliban and to the people 
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of Afghanistan. Bush compared what each citizenry must endure by asking America to “imagine 
how that makes innocent people feel…when you’ve got these killers in your midst. It creates an 
atmosphere of fear…People like al Qaeda, whose ideology is hateful, have got one major tool at 
their disposal: they kill innocent life to create fear.”64 In essence, terrorism equals fear and to 
counter that America represents freedom. Bush’s obligation as President was to not allow the 
American way to falter, fade, or be damaged by these attacks. Further, countries that do not want 
to be associated with terrorism must unite themselves with America’s goal of eliminating 
terrorists, or they will be accused of being terrorists themselves. Using this mechanism, as well 
as the recent events of 9-11 and involving countries that either suffered, sympathized, or did not 
want to misalign from America and 9-11, President Bush started the global effort to eradicate 
terrorism. This was not only America’s problem, it is the world’s, and the world must stand up 
against such atrocities or forever be under an atmosphere of fear. Vice President Cheney 
affirmed that the fight that America must endure was to “save ourselves and our children from 
living in a world of fear. We fight now in defense of civilization and humane values.”65 Allowing 
a world of fear to take shape would not be the work of the terrorists alone, it requires a certain 
reaction to the action. As the noted philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre argues, “…there is no 
determinism, man is free, man is freedom.”66 This may seem out of place, but it means that man, 
or people, must choose their own reaction to stimuli in the world around them. That is to say they 
will only be afraid of terrorism if they allow themselves to be afraid of it. Former President Bill 
Clinton agrees with this argument in a speech he delivered at Harvard when he stated, “The 
purpose [of terrorism], after all, is not to achieve military victory, but to achieve a change in 
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circumstances by terror, to make us all afraid of today, afraid of tomorrow, afraid of each other. 
Therefore, it cannot win unless we become admitting accomplices, changing the way we think 
and feel and live.”67 Even though the terrorists may not be able to win the fight using any method 
at their disposal, they can still inflict a great deal damage to the US and its allies. No liberal, 
democratic government would allow such a threat to exist while the government would be able 
to stop it. Thus, it was imperative to act against terrorism. If terrorism were not countered, it 
would act against America and attack the very core of its existence. Which is exactly what the 
Paranoid Style model describes, that the American way of life was under imminent threat and 
attack by a determined enemy who only accepts total victory. Further, a militant leader exists to 
wage the war on terrorism. Whether it is President Clinton or President Bush, or any high-
ranking cabinet official, each defined terrorism as a threat to America and its interests with the 
only clear course of action being to eliminate terrorism. After 9-11, the political leadership of the 
attacked countries spoke out against such acts of terrorism, but also went further to suggest that 
terrorism is the paramount threat to national and global security. Ignoring such a threat would 
only allow terrorism to harm American’s foundation and ruin the principles it stands on. It is not 
necessarily a military battle for victory, but also one of “hearts and minds”68 where the battle is 
one of ideals to remove terroristic operations from the drawing table. From there the fight against 
terrorism then moves on to the political stage, and away from the rhetorical. 
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United States Anti-Terror Policies   
After the attacks, there was a wave of reforms aimed at stopping any terrorist activity in 
the US from happening again. These reforms happened in three stages: first was the bureaucracy 
stage, second was the policy stage, and third was the preventative stage. Each stage is reliant on 
the other, meaning that it is not three independent stages that can work without another; instead 
they are all part of a single package for a single goal: security. 
The first stage of the reforms is in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. 
It was established in 2002 to expand the government’s role in preventing terrorism and to 
consolidate intelligence agencies into a single branch of government. With this “managerial 
category for catastrophic terrorism, which is neither war, crime nor disaster…the U.S. did not 
have a managerial approach (i.e., a framework for bringing responsibility, accountability, and 
resources together in sharp focus) to deliver a key public good – security in the homeland against 
catastrophic terrorism.”69 That is, until, the creation of DHS whose mission, as stated in the 
Homeland Security Act, is to “A) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; (B) reduce 
the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; and (C) minimize the damage, and assist in the 
recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States."70 Its goal is to be the 
figurehead of an organization for the sole purpose of combating terrorism. President Bush 
created the department with the charge of “developing and coordinating the implementation of a 
comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks.”71 
Doing so “…merged 22 different government organizations into a single department with a clear 
mission: Secure America and protect the American people from future attacks… The Department 
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of Homeland Security is working to stop terrorists from infiltrating our country.”72 Establishing a 
new department with the sole intent of presiding over security from terrorism is the first step in 
the multistep process.  
The second stage is policy. After the creation of the DHS with a stated mission, it had to 
start passing policies to accomplish its goals. In this case, that action took the form of a policy 
titled the USA PATRIOT Act. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 was passed into law 
by President Bush’s signature October 26, 2001, and was designed so that the federal 
investigating agencies could investigate suspected terrorism. To do this, there are eight general 
provisions of the bill that allow action to take place: 
(1) restrictions were lifted so as to allow intelligence and criminal justice officials to share information 
on investigations; (2) law enforcement authorities may be authorized by a special intelligence court to 
conduct ‘roving’ wiretaps on a person suspected of involvement in terrorism…;(3) intelligence 
authorities may obtain wiretap authority from the special intelligence court if foreign intelligence 
operations are a ‘significant purpose’ of the investigation…;(4) the scope of the subpoenas for 
electronic communication sent by terrorism suspects was expanded; (5) authorities may obtain 
nationwide search warrants for terrorism investigations…;(6) the law’s sunset provisions terminate the 
preceding, enhanced surveillance powers after four years; (7) the attorney general or the INS 
commissioner may certify an alien as being under suspicion of involvement in terrorism, in which case 
the alien may be held for up to seven days for questioning, after which he must be released if he is not 
charged with a violation of criminal or immigration laws; (8) possession of substances that can be used 
as biological or chemical weapons for anything other than a ‘peaceful’ purpose was criminalized, and 
criminal sentences for committing acts of terrorism and for harboring or financing terrorists or terrorist 
organizations were increased.73 
 
Granting this leeway in domestic surveillance is nothing that should be taken lightly. However, 
when the USA PATRIOT Act was up for vote in both the Senate and the House, little to no 
revisions or debate took place74. Jasmine Farrier further argues that this lack of debate and 
revision is nothing more than the ambivalence of Congress stepping aside and letting “a bill 
drafted by a handful of people in secret, subjected to no committee process comes before us 
                                                
72 Bush, George W. 2008. President Bush Commemorates Fifth Anniversary of U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security. Constitution Hall, Washington D.C. 
73 Murphy. 2002. 252-253 
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immune from amendment.”75 No formal committee, no real floor action, no substantive 
revisions, and voting it to pass twice allowed the executive branch undue amounts of power that 
they use to justify the trampling of individual rights for the end of national security.76 Protecting 
individual rights, or proper legislative process was not a concern for the passing of the PATRIOT 
Act; the goal of the act itself was to provide the government with a vehicle of action against 
terrorism. It just also happens that passing the act in the United States offered a model for other 
countries to follow suit. National security has now grown and evolved into international security 
with the United Nations Security Council adopting Resolution 1373 which calls “on member 
states to become party to all relevant international conventions on terrorism and to enact the 
necessary domestic legislation to enforce these agreements.”77 The PATRIOT Act has a much 
large effective radius than just the United States. This is conceivably a good thing as the more 
parties there are to anti-terror legislation, and who support international security, the easier it is 
to find, track, arrest and try suspected terrorists legally78.  
Congress, thankfully, does not make the same type of mistakes often. For instance, it is 
attempting to reassert its legislative authority and its obligation to check and balance the 
executive branch with the current and ongoing struggle to either pass or kill the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act79, with the added provision of retroactive immunity granted to 
telecom companies. The argument made on behalf of the administration is that the telecom 
companies are helping the government find and stop terrorists in America. In doing so, the 
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companies may have opened Pandora’s Box in violating civil liberties and privacy laws that 
would leave them susceptible to lawsuits from violated customers. If this happens, the companies 
will not be as willing to help the government as they have in the past, thus resulting in more 
terrorist activity in the US. Congress, specifically the Democratic side of the aisle, is not as 
willing to allow blanket immunity for domestic spying as it did in the wake of 9-1180. Standing 
up against the administration on this particular is being met with the kind of rhetoric that is under 
examination. President Bush has stated that not having the cooperation of the private 
communications industry would “undermine America’s security”81, and having the telecoms 
cooperating is essential to finding the enemy and what they are planning against America.82  
This is a Catch-22 with members of Congress who have to vote on these bills. To the public’s 
eyes, they are passing laws that either infringe on privacy laws or allow the enemy to subvert 
surveillance and prevent the government from stopping attacks.83 If the government is indeed 
overstepping its bounds as a government and its attempts to protect its citizens, it provides well-
choreographed rhetoric to support its movements. 
The third stage in the three part political process is the preventative stage. Once a 
structure or bureaucracy is setup, and the policies that allow that bureaucracy to function 
effectively are passed and on the books, the last step is to use those two elements to make sure 
the event that spurred their creation in the first place to never happen again. The Transportation 
Security Administration was not pulled from thin air and declared a new creation. It was founded 
on the Federal Aviation Administration’s principles, and functionally replaced the FAA. 9-11 
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was allowed to happen based on failures of the FAA and simple reform was not adequate enough 
to solve the problems. So with the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 that was 
passed in the wake of 9-11, the TSA was established as the agency to oversee passenger 
screening. Meaning “Congress eliminated the airlines’ role in passenger screening…”84 and gave 
it “broad powers to ensure aviation security.”85 In 2002, it was consolidated under the Border 
and Transportation Security Directorate. The policies in general all aim to provide security, and 
calm fears and tensions by anyone involved in mass transport in the United States and their 
families. Unfortunately, the cost of the sense of security comes at a significant price. 
These three stages of reforms all refer back to the paranoid model. The creation of a 
paranoid atmosphere in America is not something that happens overnight. While the catalysts 
may happen in the blink of an eye, to perpetuate the cycle a system has to be established to 
constantly remind the people that something could happen, and that the government needs to 
work endlessly to ensure that it does not.  
 
Paranoid Terrorism 
On face value, people are supposed to think that the PATRIOT Act, the Department of 
Homeland Defense, and the Transportation Security Administration are all good things that the 
government has done to protect the homeland. Just the names of these three policies are meant to 
sound comforting and even secure. However, these policies have forced Americans into a world 
of an extreme dichotomy. There is no longer any middle ground, or passive middle ground. 
Travel, peaceful protests, and even reading certain books all are now a product of risk 
                                                
84 Mew, Keith. 2005. Airport Security Screening Privatize or Federalize? Public Works Management & Policy. 10-
1. Pg 4. 
85 Schroer, Gregory. 2004-2005. Doomed to Repeat the Past: How the TSA is picking up where the FAA left off. 
Transportation Law Journal. 32-73. 
Sheldon 37 
assessment, and government oversight to guarantee security86. It is because of these policies and 
the rhetoric used that the Global War on Terrorism fits into Hofstadter’s Paranoid Style of 
American Politics. This is because of three specific reasons: first, the concept of the enemy; 
second, the framing of the war; third, the threat that this specific conflict or war poses to the 
global community. 
Terrorists will employ whatever means necessary to accomplished their stated goals. 
They will target anyone from the innocent to the guilty to achieve whatever their stated goal or 
objective is. There is no dispute that the methods employed to target non-military agents is 
something that is to be condemned. However, to say that anyone who does not agree with the 
government is a terrorist should produce some shock in the populous. The line between actual 
enemy and perceived enemy has become blurred. Terrorists are not state actors, and do not 
subject themselves to laws or agreements set by governments. To enact laws against the threat of 
terrorism places anyone who is accused of being involved in those types of activities in the 
terrorist column. Anyone who goes against stated government policy or action is at risk of being 
labeled a terrorist. For example, at speeches given by President Bush, “those [who are] openly 
opposed to any Bush policy are ordered into ‘protest zones,’ isolated areas as much as three 
fourths of a mile from the president….Although the administration claims the isolation is to 
‘protect’ the president from possible terrorists, a legitimate concern, the reality is that a terrorist 
merely has to wear a neutral or pro-Bush T-shirt to get into the rally.”87 All that needs to happen 
to be declared a terrorist is to openly oppose, or disagree with the status quo. This is a far 
stretching of the term “terrorists” from the definition that was offered earlier as the working 
definition. That is to say that if you are not “us” then you are obviously “them” regardless of 
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your actual ideals on government, violence, or methodology for obtaining change. The middle 
ground of politics in this area has completely dissolved. Organizations such as the ACLU, 
Greenpeace, and a number of student organizations across the nation have been under 
investigation for possible terrorist activity when they merely speak out, exercising their First 
Amendment right88. When they are told not to do so, the people speak out. One law professor 
who serves as advisor to the Drake chapter of the National Lawyers Guild at Drake University 
that was under investigation by the FBI stated that, “They want to kill speech. They want to put 
fear into the anti-war movement…”89 Terrorism is now a matter of identity by political stance; it 
could be the beginning of a slippery slope that resembles Orwell’s 1984 where the government 
spies on anyone and everyone in order to protect them from the enemy.90 
The second reason that the Global War on Terror is part of the Paranoid Style is because 
of how the war is framed and discussed in politics. Winning the war on terror has no precise 
bright line. How does the US “win”? Despite having no aims other than eradicating terrorism 
from the globe, nothing else is used as the victory goals. Although, at the same time, small 
victories have been recognized. For instance, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq are both 
justified actions for the war on terror. The buildup to both wars saw a heavy leaning on 9-11 and 
stopping it from happening again by taking the war to them91. President Bush stated that these 
two countries, in his “Mission Accomplished” speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, as 
having ties to al Qaeda, and that “the liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign 
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against terror.”92 Bush stated that progress was being achieved and that it was moving in the 
right direction; however, his speech fell short of saying that it was a victory.93 In both 
Afghanistan and Iraq, they are both seen as progress against terrorism, but not victories against 
terrorism. Terrorism has dominated politics and political structure since 9-11; government 
thrives on security and has reorganized itself to meet that need. In fact, reorganization, itself, is 
seen as an accomplishment against terrorism. President Bush bragged that: 
In this new war, we’ve undertaken the most sweeping reorganization of the federal government since the 
start of the cold war. We created a new Department of Homeland Security,…to protect America from 
future attacks. We created the new Director of National Intelligence, which has led a broad restructuring of 
our nation’s intelligence agencies for the threats of the 21st century. We have transformed the FBI into an 
agency whose primary focus is stopping terrorism, and reorganized the Department of Justice to help us 
meet this new threat. We passed the PATRIOT Act, which broke down barriers that prevented law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies from sharing vital information on terrorist threats.94 
 
Even though the US has reorganized government to better protect the people of America, the 
threat is not gone, nor has it diminished. Bush recently acknowledged at the fifth anniversary of 
the DHS that “we must also remember that the danger to our country has not passed. Since the 
attacks of 9-11, the terrorists have tried to strike our homeland again and again…The lesson of 
this experience is clear. It’s clear to me, and I know it is clear to you: The enemy remains active, 
deadly in its intent – and in the face of this danger, the United States must never let down its 
guard”.95 The fact is, the administration has framed the war on terror as not just a military battle, 
but is an ongoing battle of ideology that forces us to act both defensively and offensively. If 
action is not taken, in any capacity, then the United States will be vulnerable to more and more 
deadly attacks.  
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The final reason that the Paranoid Style applies to the War on Terror is the threat that it 
poses to the global community. It is not just a war that states can remain neutral on. Since the 
President’s response on 9-11, all countries are forced to take a stance on terrorism: they are 
either fighting for freedom and democracy to prevent terrorism, or they are fighting against 
freedom and democracy and allowing terrorism to happen. The war is not just the United States’ 
war, it is the world’s own war against a unified enemy96. Unlike World Wars I and II, there are 
no alliances and axis, where coalitions of states are pitted against each other; the GWOT is all 
states engaging in an “ideological struggle between tyranny and freedom”97 in which “we have 
fought the enemy on every single battlefront. And so long as the terrorist danger remains, the 
United States of America will continue to fight the enemy wherever it makes its stand. We will 
stay on the offensive.”98 Worldwide wars of states versus states is absent and has been replaced 
with a global war shifting the emphasis to making the struggle something that affects all states 
and that all states need to be involved in solving. The theatre of operation is the entire globe, and 
the US will pursue this elusive and faceless enemy to the fullest extent possible. Its like Where’s 
Waldo, but without really knowing what Waldo looks like. 
Hofstadter’s thesis about the unique style of American politics describes the nature of the 
Global War on Terrorism. By looking at the shifts in policy and rhetoric that have occurred since 
the attacks on September 11, 2001, the model of the Paranoid Style describes these changes 
aptly. Using the elements of the model and the characteristics that describe the paranoid leader, 
the Global War on Terror becomes a fitting example of the Paranoid Style in action.  
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Analytical Comparison 
Besides the obvious, what separates these two time periods of conflict from each other? 
In short, the answer is caution; fear is used in the same manner in order to elicit entirely different 
actions. Why is this the case? The key issue is motivation for the use of fear. For instance, during 
the Cold War, fear was more or less a safety mechanism to prevent catastrophe from happening. 
Underlining the entire Cold War era is the fact of survival. Preventing the two great states from 
unleashing their arsenals on each other became the main focus of the conflict. It evolved from a 
war of political ideology to a war of cautious probing while still preventing nuclear war. Because 
of this evolution, it was necessary to frame it with a cautionary rhetoric that halted action. Fear 
provided politicians and world leaders with the proper tool in order to stave off disaster. On the 
other hand, for the War on Terror fear has become a weapon of the terrorist to change policy or 
culture. It is not a contest of strength and restraint, it is a fight in which liberty and freedom itself 
is at stake. Fear, then, is not something that requires an exercise of caution, but to exercise 
activity. The checks on action have been removed with the shift of the rhetoric surrounding fear 
and it has become necessary for people to not be afraid of being attacked or of what the terrorists 
may do to a state or society. The underlining issue then is the prevention of the destruction of 
ideological concepts that are central to liberal societies. If fear is that weapon of destruction, then 
it must be eliminated as its safety role in rhetoric. Fear must be redefined as something that can 
not be utilized as a weapon as is the case in the Global War on Terror and that has no place in 
liberal democracies.  
Further, the type of enemy has changed as well. Changing the enemy requires a different 
approach to how it is viewed and discussed. During the Cold War, the US could identify its 
enemies and see what they were capable of. US intelligence was generally aware of what the 
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Soviet Union was doing. When Sputnik was launched, and when the USSR started building its 
space program, it was a public action to show Soviet strength and “superiority over the United 
States in science and economics, politics and ideology – in short, Soviet supremacy all across the 
board”99. The space race was nothing more than an alternative competition between the two 
governments flexing their muscles to see who would win. However, being able to identify your 
enemies can be more fearful than being left in the dark. It was knowing the potential 
consequences of action from both sides that caused foreign policy at that time to be cautious. If 
policy mechanisms such as MAD did not exist, and people did not have an idea of the destructive 
capabilities of the two states, action (in a reckless manner) may have happened. Being able to 
discern threats posed by specific states in specific theatres allowed for analysts to decide the 
threat level and the subsequent necessary actions to be taken. It was not a perception of an 
enemy, but a clearly defined threat to US interests. 
On the other hand, the Global War on Terrorism utilizes fear as a reason to act instead to 
prevent action. Not knowing what the enemy looks like or what it is currently capable of, the 
worse case scenario is assumed. The US led coalition against terrorism to make sure that 
terrorists do not get a hold of weapons of mass destruction (as the case for the war in Iraq was 
made) or be able to act again (“fighting them there so we do not have to fight them here”). Not 
knowing what the terrorists are planning or what they are capable of “forces” states to act 
preemptively in an attempt to stop any terrorist activity. Even though politicians have said that 
the people should not fear because doing so would allow the terrorists to win100, the actions that 
they are taking suggest otherwise. The speeches that state that the terrorists are always planning, 
that they always are acting against American people advocate a mindset that America should be 
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afraid. If we were to be truly fearless of the faceless threat, then we should not restructure our 
government, or advocate policies that infringe on civil liberties to make sure that the terrorists 
can be caught. Robin Williams characterizes this best in his HBO standup comedy routine. In his 
act, he quips, “Remember when they sent Anthrax to Tom Daschle's office? And they cleared 
that …place out. Everybody out, come on! Helmets, suits, they're all leaving. And when the 
Congressman walked out they go: "But the rest of you, go about your lives. Everything is 
perfectly OK."101 The old adage, do as I say, not as I do could not apply more than in this 
situation. The dichotomy of the rhetorical approach is one that requires fear to be used to prevent 
destruction by either being a mechanism of caution or one that calls for immediate action.  
 
Conclusion 
The two case studies of the Cold War and the Global War on Terror provide insight and 
evidence for analysis using Hofstadter’s Paranoid Style of American Politics. Through this 
examination, there are two time periods of conflict that can be defined as being part of the 
Paranoid Style. However, there is a key difference between the two, and that is that the militant 
leader is absent from the Cold War. The examination looks at the use of fear by political leaders 
during both cases and comes to the conclusion that the rhetoric used by the Cold War was that of 
caution to prevent disaster. On the other hand, the leader during the Global War on Terror claims 
that if action is not taken right away, then freedom and liberty will suffer. It is the role of the 
President that separates the Cold War from the Global War on Terror in the context of the 
Paranoid Style Model. 
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However, the Global War on Terror does meet the five conditions, the three elements of 
the model as well as the two characteristics of the paranoid leader, that are outlined in the model. 
Both the Cold War and the Global War on Terror are good cases to examine in context of the 
Paranoid Style argument. In this case, it was done by looking at what was being said at those 
times by the political leadership, the goal of policies shifted with the terms of rhetoric. The move 
from survival against communist expansion and an arms race to not letting the terrorists win as 
the primary goal, the Paranoid Style came into full fruition with the shifting policies. The 
rhetoric of the Cold War suggests that the overall outcome was survival with an ideological 
enemy whereas the War on Terror wants to eradicate terrorism from the face of the planet. It is 
that difference between the two eras that delineates them from each other. 
The Paranoid Style will never fully disappear or shy away from American politics. 
Despite its ever present framework for policy, it does come in waves and fluctuations and it so 
happens that the Cold War and the War on Terror happened back to back and provide a good 
comparison for examination for the Paranoid style. It is knowing the manner in which politics is 
done that allows a change to occur. By recognizing the paranoid style as what it is and its impact 
on American politics, the citizenry can understand and recognize the policy transformations and 
not buy into the reasons for which both are done. Despite the current era of the Global War on 
Terror, the globe did survive the Cold War and its policy choices, so there is no reason to think 
that the policies from the Paranoid Style of the Global War on Terror cannot be survived as well. 
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